A Case Study of Sudan and South Sudan

“One cloudy morning [in 2008], I saw some people dividing our farm, claiming that we have not paid the fees of the ownership renewal — even though we inherited the land; we used to live in a part of it and farm the other area. But overnight we became homeless.”

The above is a quote from a farmer in the southern part of Sudan and demonstrates a serious issue in both Sudan and South Sudan: the appropriation of land by governments and militant forces at the expense of those who rely on them on a daily basis. Prior to 2011, the Sudan existed as one country with a distinct ethnic division between the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian south. The uneven distribution of power held by the north led to widespread violence between both parts of the country and separation eventually ensued in the hope this would bring peace to what eventually became South Sudan. Peace, however, was short-lived and another brutal civil war erupted between the two largest ethnic groups of South Sudan, the Dinka and the Nuer. Today, unrest is widespread in both countries.  

State land grabs have plagued Sudan with the government exploiting the lack of official documents which would declare rightful land ownership (Saeed 2010). Almost 4 million hectares of land have been redistributed to investors, officials and businessmen close to the government, often in attempts to secure political patronage, over a ten-year period (World Bank 2010). Many of the displaced go on to join rebel forces. Unfortunately, the situation in South Sudan is no different. South Sudan has considerable agricultural potential due to advantageous soil and climatic conditions, meaning over 70% of the total land offers productive agricultural services (Diao et al. 2012), enough to sustain the security of the people. However, farms are often totally inaccessible to locals because of the fighting around them, destroying any possibility of securing a reliable food supply. 

Data from the Land Matrix highlights the extent to which these land grabs have taken place. Investors have acquired a total of over 10.3 million hectares of land from Nile basin countries since 2000 with Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan topping this list.

Figure 1. Top 20 Target Countries of Land Grabs. The relevant countries are highlighted in yellow. (Source: Land Matrix)

The war in Darfur, an eastern region of Sudan, is characterised by the ethnic cleansing of the non-Arab population by the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militia. The Janjaweed are notorious for their ethnic hatred of non-Arab Darfurians, burning large areas of their cropland and selling some of the region's most productive land to other ethnic groups or overseas private investors (Unruh and Abdul-Jalil 2014). Affording the rights of these lands to investors is highly problematic in the context of achieving food security for local populations as it not only hinders local crop production, but also takes away from the potential of virtual water trade due to the scale of these grabs. As such, the opportunities some scholars (e.g. Deininger 2011) associate with foreign interests, namely the development of rural communities, simply aren’t a priority for communities without their fundamental resources.
  

The forceful dispossession and allocation of land to private investors creates even greater hardship for locals when water is directly (or visibly in the context of virtual water) involved. This is the case for long stretches of highly fertile land around the Nile where local communities are forced out to make way for these investors; the government’s neglect of a principle held by many Southern Sudanese people, that ‘land belongs to the community’ (Deng 2011), has further fuelled conflict in the region. It is important to remember that the threat of famine now facing more than 5.5 million people at the start of 2020 (WFP 2019) is due to war, and not drought. Parts of the Nile have even become something of a frontline for warring ethnic groups, effectively making it impossible for locals to safely access its waters. This continuous disregard for the people of South Sudan will only exacerbate the issues of security across the country as farmers migrate in search for land, breeding conflict over the control of land and water in increasingly smaller spaces.

Though the involvement of private investors and foreign states in the acquisition of land and water from the Sudanese undoubtedly plays a huge role in impacting food and water security, the responsibility for the failure in providing an adequate standard of living for locals ultimately falls to the government. Both Sudan and South Sudan rank in the top 10 most corrupt states in the world and political instability and corruption at the highest level in the form of Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year tenure has perpetuated the problems facing Sudanese populations. An inevitable desperation for revenue following the independence of South Sudan, and along with-it huge oil reserves, the Sudanese government ceded lands to the rich at the expense of their own poor. With that in mind, the pictures below are particularly upsetting as locals must accept the depletion of what were once their resources.

Figure 2. Dried farmland owned by a Saudi-Yemeni firm following the over-pumping of the aquifer beneath the property.

Figure 3. Sudanese family gathering water from a tank owned by a private firm outside their village.

In conclusion, Sudan and South Sudan offer a vital insight into the devastating effects of poor governance on food security. Having been first made aware of this conflict in the context of ethnic disputes during the latter stages of secondary school, I wanted to revisit it today to explore the impact of this on resource security. I hope I have provided a platform for you to further consider the significance of land and water grabs in Sudan and other parts of the world.